The generally accepted paradigm, whereby “representations” cover past and existing statements and cover the “guarantees” of existing and future declarations, is as strong as the claims of a patent application issued prior to an initial appeal by the Agency. This is probably why it is common for signatories to use the form: “Part A represents and justifies [inserting) the statement (s) of the facts].” But what does that mean? It could be argued that the deluded/non-romper party would then have the choice of a complaint for misrepresentation (fraudulent, negligent and innocent) or a complaint for breach of the guarantee if the statement proves to be false. But not all commentators and courts can accept this conclusion. Surprisingly, the first book of conventionist horns I used in law school is silent on this subject! But all these questions go beyond the scope of this article. What is relevant to the current purpose is that it would be clearer to express the intended meaning explicitly rather than to use representations, warrants or both to include or exclude certain remedies, when it is a separate question of whether it would be worth it. To explain why treaty expression is an expression, the delay is as insufficient as the appeal movement. The High Court recently highlighted this distinction in its analysis of the terms of a sales contract (SPA) concluded as part of an oil and gas exploration project. The case of Idemnitsu Kosan Co Ltd/Sumitomo Co Corp  therefore provides welcome clarity for all commercial parties. It would be easy to express the equivalent of representations or warrants or both. Instead of using representations and safeguards to substantiate factual claims, an author who motivates the remedies could have the same effect by stating that any party can claim a false presentation, a right to a breach of the guarantee or both if the other party makes inaccurate factual allegations. And instead of merely using arrest warrants, an author who accepts restrictive measures could have the same effect by stating that each party waives any right of misrepresentation if the other party makes inaccurate factual allegations; It could also be explicitly concluded that each party can, instead, assert a right to breach the guarantee.
(The reflection of this provision would express the equivalent of restrictive remedies and the rationale for using a single use.) If the permissive and restrictive justifications are different, the way they deal with a factual claim that is not made by representations or guarantees or both, or otherwise, explicitly as collateral, warranty or both.